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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF·UTAH
FLORA S. MECHAM, et al,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 7865

ARTHUR R. ALLEN and
J. H. ALLEN,

Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants Statement of Facts seems so meager, so
lacking in some essentials, that Respondents deem it
advisable to restate the facts in detail.
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On page 1 of appellants' brief they make the following statement: "That the Mechams had left their home
in Wallsburg, Wasatch County, early on the morning
of July 4th." There is nothing in the record, and appellants make no reference in the record to support their
statement as to whether the Mechams left early or late
in the morning. The only reference is at page 266
where Flora Mecham stated, "We went down the canyon
that morning to see the parade and then came back
just before noon to have lunch."
Tom Mecham, the decedent, was driving a Chevrolet
automobile at the time of his death. Appellant Arthur
Allen was driving a Ford tractor-trailer unit with an
over-all length of 45 feet.
On the 3rd of July, the day before the accident, appellant Arthur Allen and Dale Mousley left Draper,
Utah, about 4: 30 p. m. in the afternoon. They drove the
Ford tractor-trailer to Wendover, Utah. R. 354, 384, 376.
There they slept about an hour and then loaded cattle
until about 12:00 o'clock midnight. R 377. They then
started back, drove all that night, stopped in Pleasant
Grove for breakfast and arrived at their destination
where they were to deliver the cattle, about 20 miles
east of Heber, about 10:00 a.m. that morning. R. 397.
After unloading the cattle they proceeded down Provo
Canyon to the place where they ran into the Mecham
Chevrolet automobile which was traveling up canyon.
Appellants state at page 3 of their brief, "Other than
the occupants of the car, no creditable witnesses to the
accident were produced at the trial." Appellants' statement is untrue. A resume of the testimony of the various
witnesses is given herewith.
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Mr. Otis L. Ercanbrack, eyewitness to the accident,
testified that he was traveling up Provo Canyon on the
day of the accident and was the third car behind the
Mecham car when appellants tractor-trailer ran into
Mecham. R. 236. Witness Ercanbrack testified that the
Ford tractor-trailer attempted to pass an old Chevrolet
or Ford (R. 237) but apparently when appellant saw
that he could not pass without running into the Mecham
car, he attempted to cut the tractor-trailer back to his
own side of the road, but could not get back to his own
side of the highway before he had rammed into the
Mecham car. R. 238, 239. Ercanbrack further testified
that at the time of the impact the appellants' tractortrailer was on the Mecham's side of the highway. R.
239, 240. The front of the tractor was about threequarters over on the Mecham side of the road; the back
of the trailer was just about completely on the Mecham
side of the road. R. 239.
Mr. Ercanbrack stated he did not get out of his
truck. R. 240. He was motioned around the Mecham
car and continued up the highway. Witness Ercanbrack
stated that when the two cars involved in the accident
came to rest, that the back of the trailer was resting on
the front of the Mecham car. R. 258. That the driver of
the tractor-trailer backed up his unit and "with the help
of the men that were there, they got hold of the side of
the truck and sort of slipped Tom's car back to the side."
R. 249, 250, 260. They then took Tom Mecham out of his
car and laid him down on the ground.
Mr. Ercanbrack testified that he was a neighbor of
W. 0. Mecham; that he had known his son Tom; that
they had lived in the same town of Wallsburg, Mr.
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Mecham living at one end, he living at the middle.
That he did not know it was W. 0. Mecham's son Tom
that was killed until he heard W. 0. Mecham arrive
on the scene and make the statement, "Oh, God, its my
boy." Witness Ercanbrack was shown the various pictures which were introduced as exhibits in this case
showing the wrecked Mecham automobile and the
tractor-trailer. He expressly and particularly with reference to Exhibit D, stated that the automobile and truck
were not in the position as shown in Exhibit D at the
time he first saw them. R. 257. At page 258 of the record
he made the statement, with reference to the position of
the tractor-trailer and automobile, as shown in Exhibit
D, "It should be connected up with this trailer here.
"Q. You say that the trailer here should be
connected up with the car that appears in the picture?
"A. Pretty close to the radiator of this car so you
could see it* *."

Further with reference to Exhibit 1 that was shown
to him and introduced as an exhibit, Mr. Ercanbrack
stated it did not represent the correct position of the cars
after the impact. R. 260.
Mr. W. 0. Mecham in his testimony estimated that
he arrived at the scene of the accident approximately
3 or 4 minutes after the occurrence. That it was probably
30 minutes before the ambulance arrived at the scene
of the accident. R. 117, 118. W. 0. Mecham further testified that after he arrived at the scene of the accident he
began looking for the little children. That in looking for
the little girl he discovered two big marks upon the
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asphalt surface of the road in the Mecham lane of traffic
up canyon from the Mecham car, indicating dual tire
marks. R. 127, 128. He estimated they were about 4 feet
in length and the nearest mark to the center line was
about 2 feet away. R. 128.
Mr. Warren Peay testified that at the time of the
accident he was patrolling the pipe line of the Utah
Power & Light Company in Provo Canyon. R. 220. That
he did not see the accident but that he heard it. That
upon hearing the accident he walked back up the pipe
and came down the canyon to the scene. Mr. Peay testified that he arrived on the scene of the accident in about
20 or 30 minutes. R. 221. That at the time he arrived
the two vehicles involved in the accident were in the
following position-the truck was off to the side of the
road in the lane for down canyon traffic and the touring
car was turned diagonally across the road on the M~cham
side of the road for up-canyon traffic. R. 221. Mr. Peay
further testified that he made an examination of the
·highway the following day and that he noticed two
marks on the highway up from where the Mecham car
was located. R. 223. Mr. Peay testified that these marks
were approximately 3 to 4 feet long and that they were
located close together. That one was just about on the
center line and the other one on the opposite side of
the center line. They were on the side of the road for
up-canyon traffic, and they were made from dual tires.
R. 224. Mr. Peay further testified that they examined
that spot on the road several times subsequent to this
day and that these marks were still there on the road
for a period of two or three days.
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Mrs. Flora Mecham, one of the plaintiffs in this suit,
testified that as they were proceeding up the canyon,
she was looking out to the side of the road and a car had
just passed them when she turned and saw this big
truck swaying. That this truck in relation to the highway itself appeared to her to be on the side of the road
for up-canyon travel, their lane of traffic. R. 269, 270.
That she was rendered unconscious at the time of the
impact. R. 270. She did know that she regained consciousness for a short time subsequent to the accident
and that she was out on the side of the road, but that
she never saw her husband alive subsequent to the
impact. R. 270.
Mr. Arthur Allen, one of the defendants in this
action, was not present in court during the trial, but his
deposition was read into the record. Said deposition was
taken upon stipulation of counsel for plaintiffs and defendants. R. 350. Mr. Arthur R. Allen testified that on
the day of the accident, the 4th of July, there was a lot
of traffic going down and up the canyon. R. 359. That
subsequent to the impact his truck came to rest to the
side of the road by some Cottonwood trees. That it was
not touching or close by the Chevrolet automobile. He
stated that the truck could not be moved at the time it
came to rest. R. 361. That he saw no one attempt to
move the truck by hand and he did not attempt to move
it under its own power; that it was only moved when
the wrecker hooked onto it to take it away. R. 362. He
further testified that the Chevrolet automobile was approximately 25 feet from the rear of the semi-trailer at
the time it came to rest. R. 3'62. That the truck, except
for the left front wheel was entirely off the highway on
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the righthand side and that cars could freely pass. That
the Chevrolet automobile was across the highway, the
front end protruding about 2 feet across the center line
and that it was obstructing traffic in this particular. R.
362, 363. Mr. Allen testified that he first saw the Chevrolet automobile when it was about 100 or 150 feet down
the canyon from him. R. 363. He stated, "Well, I was
just coming around Bridal Veil Falls. I was still on the
bend when I saw the car coming through the trees, I was
just close to it, the car swerved at me and I cut it off
the road." Mr. Allen later corrected this statement to
read, "The car sv;erved at me and I cut the truck off
the road. And I hit my air brakes and left tire marks
where I left the road, and I went out through the trees
and off my side of the road." Mr. Allen stated that when
he first saw the Chevrolet automobile it was on its own
side of the road; that when it was 35 or 40 feet from him
that it changed its direction and came head-on into his
truck. R. 364, 365. Mr. Allen testified that the left front
corner of his trailer unit hit the Chevrolet; that it was
not a head-on collision; ·that the Chevrolet automobile
missed the cab. That he examined the brake marks
made by the dual wheels of his truck on the surface of
the road. That he talked to a number of people at the
accident and he remembered talking to the highway
patrolman, Dale Mousley and Allen P. Smith of Draper
He knew of no eye witnesses to the accident. R. 366,
367. Mr. Allen further testified that there were no cars
just ahead of him and that if there had been any he
would have seen them. R. 368.
Mr. Dale Mousley, who was riding in the truck with
Mr. Allen, testified that he was not driving at the time
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of the accident. That they were proceeding down Provo
Canyon and he wasn't paying attention to the road.
That he was a little tired as he had been up all night
the night before. That the first thing that disturbed him
was a statement from Arthur Allen when he hollered,
"Look out." Up to that time he hadn't been paying too
much attention and that all he saw was the top of the
Mecham car pass the truck. R. 387, 388. After striking
the Mecham car he felt the truck go over to the righthand side of the road. R. 388. Mr. Mousley stated that
when the truck stopped it was clear off the highway onto
the dirt and the Mecham car was 30 or 40 feet up-canyon
and 2 feet across the middle line of the highway. R.
389, 390. Mr. Dale Mousley further testified that no cars
appeared on the scene of the accident for 2 or 3 minutes
and that there were no cars at the site at the time of
the accident. R. 391, 392.
Mr. Neldon Evans, an officer of the Utah Highway
Patrol, investigated the accident. R. 319. Mr. Evans
testified that he received a call about 11:40 or 11:30. That
he was going north from Provo on Highway 189 and
that it took him approximately 10 to 15 minutes to drive
to the scene from the time he got the call. R. 320. Officer Clark, another officer of the highway patrol, followed Officer Evans to the scene of the accident. That
at the time Officer Evans and Officer Clark arrived at
the scene of the accident the injured people were in the
ambulance, so they helped the ambulance turn around
and start down the canyon. They then ·began their investigation, i.e., to take measurements and inquire around
for any witnesses. R. 321. Mr. Evans testified that at the
time he arrived at the scene of the accident that the
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tractor-trailer,-"lt was sitting on the north side of the
highway, pretty well off the highway, under some trees
facing down the canyon facing west." R. 322. The Chevrolet automobile was on the south part of the highway
with the front end extending about to the middle of the
line "and 72 feet up-canyon from the tractor-trailer .. ,
R. 322, Exhibit 8. Mr. Evans testified that he saw tire
burns or marks upon the highway. R. 323. That these
tire burns started about 4 ft. north of the center line
in the lane for automobiles moving down canyon, and
extended to a point at the rear of the truck that was
off to the north side of the road. R. 323. That there were
gouges in the oiled surface and the gouges extended
to the point where the automobile came to rest. R. 323.
On the diagram, Exhibit 8, Officer Evans placed a
rectangle and in that rectangle the letter "M" to represent the Mcham car as it was situated on the highway at the time he arrived at the scene. Officer Evans
also placed a rectangle on the diagram Exhibit 8, and
placed the initial "T" in said rectangle to represent the
tractor-trailer. R. 328, 329. Officer Evans also placed
upon the diagram lines to represent the tire burns and
gouges on the road. He placed an initial "B" by the tire
burns and an initial "G" by the gouges. R. 330. Officer
Evans testified that most of the damage was to the rear
wheels of the tractor, the front of the trailer and the rear
wheels of the trailer, although there was a little mark
on the tractor just over the front tire. But it wasn't
very deep. R. 331, 333. Officer Evans testified that he
remained at the scene of the accident about an hour
and 15 or 20 minutes and that the trailer and tractor
were moved by a wrecker during that time. R. 332.
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Officer Evans testified that the tractor and trailer were
incapable of being moved at the time he examined them
except by means of a wrecker. R. 353.
Officer Evans testified that they looked for other
marks besides the ones he drew on the diagram and they
found no other marks. That they asked the bystanders
if they had seen the accident and they found no witnesses to the accident. R. 336. Officer Lawrence J. Clark
of the Utah Highway Patrol also testified at the trial.
His testimony with reference to the position of the
vehicles and the marks upon the highway was substantially the same as that testified to by Officer Neldon
Evans. R. 239.
The plaintiffs called William White of Provo, Utah,
as a witness. Mr. White had previously been listed as
an eye witness by the plaintiffs in response to interrogatories submitted by defendants. R. 169, R. 19. Mr.
White, in company with his brother and their wives,
was traveling up Provo Canyon at the time of the accident. R. 169, 170. Mr. White upon being examined
by plaintiffs' counsel suddenly could not remember anything regarding the accident, or that he was an eye
witness to the accident or that he had previously stated
to either Mr. Boyce or Mr. Leland McCullough prior to
the trial that he was an eye witness to the accident. R.
173-177. Mr. White when asked, "Did you tell me and
Mr. McCullough on that occasion that you had witnessed
this accident?" A. "I don't remember of it sir, I may
have done it." R. 179.
The court at page 192 of the record questioned Mr.
White as follows:
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THE COURT: Mr. White, have some of the answers
you gave to Mr. Boyce on his first examination of you
been different than what you told him on these three
occasions when he says that he talked to you at your
home?
A. Well, I really don't know, sir.
THE COURT: Well if there are any what, if any,
is your explanation of any inconsistencies in your testimony between today, if it occurred, and statements you
are supposed to have made to Mr. Boyce on any of these
three occasions?
A. Well, I don't really know just what I really have
told him, sir, and-I don't really .know what to say
about it." R. 193.
Dr. Glen Allen of Provo testified as to the injuries
suffered by Flora Mecham. He stated as follows,
"The wound was an avulsed type of laceration,
more or less 'Y' shaped, extending from the nose,
the bridge of the nose I should say back over to the
scalp; forked in two directions, to the right and to
the left, almost completely avulsing the scalp from
the skull."
R. 199. She suffered also a compound fracture of the
nose, traumatic injuries and shock. R. 200. There was
also a mild concussion. R. 200. At the time he examined
Flora Mecham the scalp was torn off exposing the bony
area of the skull and bleeding profusely. R. 201. Dr.
Allen's last examination of Mrs. Mecham on Nov. 30,
1950, showed that the wound had healed but there was
a scar which is evident and some skin or cutaneous, what
is called anesthesia localized to the area of the scar.
R. 201, 202.
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Dr. Allen also examined Leonard Mecham subsequent to the accident. He had a rather jagged laceration of the left eyebrow and of the left forehead region.
R. 203. That he suffered a mild brain concussion. R.
203.
Linda Mecham was directed to the hospital. She
suffered abrasions and wounds of the face but her injuries were rather minor. R. 204.
Dr. Allen testified that he examined Gary Mecham,
the baby; that the left ear was almost completely
avulsed from the skull, or the scalp, and he also showed
some signs of inter-cranial damage. Approximately five
hours after his admission to the hospital he developed
some neurological signs consisting of rigidity, spasms,
and he was immediately taken to a neuro-surgeon in
Salt Lake City. R. 204.
Dr. Stewart Wright, a neuro-surgeon in Salt Lake
City, testified to the injuries of Gary Mecham as follows: (R. 207)
"Well, when I first saw Gary he was unconscious. The history, as we have mentioned, was
that he had been in a car which had been involved
in an accident and he had been unconscious from
the moment of the accident. He had many signs of
severe brain damage, including the unconsciousness,
which I mentioned. The left eye turned inward
and both eyes turned to the right more than average.
The neck was stiff, the left pupil, the pupil of the
left eye, was larger than the right one. The right,
lower extremity, the right leg, was completely
paralyzed and the right upper extremity was almost
completely paralyzed. The left leg was somewhat
rigid or stiff. There was a Babinski sign, we call it,
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on the left side, which indicated damage to the right
side of the brain or spinal cord. There was considerable swelling of the left side of the head and face;
there was a laceration above the left ear of the scalp
which had involved the ear and which had been
sutured and cared for by Dr. Allen, as I think he
described earlier. There was a compound fracture of
the left lower jaw. The temperature was high; the
pulse and the breathing was very fast, and the blood
pressure was higher than you normally find in a
child of that age. He was about eighteen months, as
I recall, when I first saw him. Those are essentially
the things which were noted when I first saw him."
R. 267, 268.
The first care given to Gary was primarily care
in sustaining his life as he was desperately ill. R. 268.
Dr. Wright further testified that in his opinion the child,
Gary Mecham, suffers a permanent disability as a result
of this accident. R. 214. That in Dr. Wright's opinion
he would never have the normal use of the hand, or the
arm, or the foot or leg on the right side, for all practical
purposes. R. 214.
Mr. Leo Hales of Provo, the service manager of
Naylor Auto Company, received a call on the day of the
accident to bring a wrecker up Provo Canyon. That
when he got up the canyon he noted a Chevrolet across
the road. R. 401. The tractor and trailer were on the
left hand side of the road coming down the canyon and
off the oiled road. He arrived at the scene of the accident
at the time the Utah County Sheriff's office was taking
pictures. The State Highway Patrol was there at the
time he arrived. R. 401. Mr. Hales testified that the
Highway Patrolmen asked him if he could move the
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truck; that he hooked onto the truck but that he could
not move it. R. 401. That he picked up the front
end of the truck and set it off the oil of the road. R. 401.
Mr. Lester Beck, also an employee of the Naylor
Auto Company, was called by Mr. Hales to assist him
in moving the truck, trailer and the automobile. His
testimony with reference to the position of the tractortrailer and Chevrolet automobile is substantially the
same as that of Mr. Hales. R. 415.
Officer Myron Gale of the Highway Patrol testified
for the defendants and ·stated that he visited the scene
of the accident sometime between the 5th and lOth of
July subsequent to the accident. R. 417, 418, 419. He
testified with reference to marks that there was a scuff
or gouge mark on the north side of the highway about
2 feet from the center line and coming into, towards the
center line. That these marks were in the lane for downcanyon traffic. He further testified that he did not recall
any other marks on the highway. R. 419, 420.
Counsel for plaintiffs called Mr. Alfred Carter to
testify on rebuttal, permission for which was granted
by the court and no objection was taken to his testimony.
R. 423. Mr. Carter testified that on the 4th of July, 1950,
the day of the accident, he was fishing the Provo River
on the opposite side of the river from where this accident
took place. R. 423. Upon the diagram, Exhibit 8, Mr.
Carter drew t~o rectangles to indicate the position of
the Mecham automobile and the tractor-trailer unit
driven by Defendant Allen. Mr. Carter made an "R"
to indicate a rock in the river from which he was fishing
and from this rock he could look over and see the vehicles
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involved in the collision. R. 424. Counsel for defendant,
on voir dire examination, asked Mr. Carter when he had
first talked to counsel for plaintiffs and Carter stated,
"Saturday" which was the Saturday during the recess
of the trial. R. 425, 426. That was the first time Mr.
Carter had ever talked to any of the counsel for plaintiffs. Mr. Carter drew two rectangles on Exhibit 8
labeling the tractor and trailer "T-1" and the passenger
car "M-1." The Chevrolet automobile at the time Mr.
Carter saw it was partially under the back end <;>f the
trailer. R. 427. The trailer was stopped at this point. At
the time Mr. Carter saw the vehicles from where he
was standing on the rock by the river they were in the
same position that he drew on the map, Exhibit 8. R.
428. The front end of the passenger car was just about
a foot maybe 18 inches under the trailer by the back
wheels. R. 428. The back end of the trailer with reference to the center line of the highway was over the center
line of the highway. R. 428, 429. The back end of the
trailer being in the lane for up-canyon traffic. R. 429.
Mr. Carter further testified that he left the scene of the
accident, that he came back up the canyon in a passenger
car about a half-hour later. That the tractor and trailer
had been moved to the side of the road and down the
canyon 35 or 40 feet from where the accident occurred.
R. 430. The passenger car was moved off on the opposite
side of the street from the tractor-trailer, and the front
end of the Chevrolet car was on the hard surfaced portion of the highway. R. 430. On cross examination Mr.
Carter testified that at the time of the accident he was
living in Provo; that he was an iron worker for the Utah
Construction at Geneva Steel; and at that time his im-
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mediate foreman was Jack Stapler. R. 431. That he
had started on this job July 6, 1938. R. 432. Mr. Carter
testified that when he drove back up the canyon about
a half hour after the accident he rode in his brotherin-law's car, Max Peterson, who lived at Orem, Utah.
R. 432. Mr. Carter testified that he remembered working at Geneva Steel with Rollo Blackhurst and Bud Hawkins at the time the accident occurred. These men were
members of the gang with which he was working. R.
432. Mr. Carter testified that from where he was standing on the bank of the river fishing that the foliage
thinned out across the river and up to the road so that
it was possible to see the road without any obstructions.
R. 434, 435. Mr. Carter testified that he was at the scene
of the accident the first time approximately 4 or 5
minutes, and that the police were not there at the time
he saw the accident the first time. R. 439. In examining
Exhibit 4, .Mr. Carter testified that the Chevrolet automobile was approximately in that position when he saw
it the first time. R. 440. That with reference to the
tractor and trailer in Exhibit 1, that the tractor and
trailer were in the position shown in the exhibit when
he saw it the second time. That he did not see the
tractor-trailer moved while he was there. Mr. Carter
stated that at the time he examined the wreck the first
time the bed of the trailer was resting on the rear dual
wheels. R. 446. Mr. Carter was asked with reference
to the wheels on the tractor, whether or not they were
in line with the other wheels; he answered, "No, they
were bent outward." R. 448. Mr. Carter testified that he
saw no one at the scene of the accident whom he recognized. R. 450. That he did not talk to anyone around
the accident at that time. R.. 450.
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At the close of the presentation of the evidence, Mr.
Billings, one of the counsel for the defendants, stated:
"Well, now, Your Honor, at this time on behalf
of the defendants, J. H. Allen and Arthur R. Allen,
I move for a directed verdict upon the grounds that
the plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the accident was caused by the
negligence of the defendant, Arthur Allen, in driving
his truck on the highway in Provo Canyon on July
4, 1950, and the evidence, the physical evidence undisputedly shows that the accident happened on the
defendant Allen's side of the highway and that the
only evidence in conflict therewith is the oral testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack and perhaps this fisherman
and under the well established rule of this jurisdiction where the uncontroverted physical evidence
establishes the facts the oral testimony conflicting
therewith must be disregarded and is not substantial
evidence.
"The court: You don't mean by that they failed
to prove a prima facie case, do you?
"Mr. Billings: Yes.
"The Court: Your motion will be denied." R.
452.

Defendants at page 4 of their statement of fact,
state in the second paragraph that, "the occupants of the
truck were not seriously injured but the force of the
impact twisted the rear wheels of the truck, broke its
rear springs and the drive shaft and bent the frame of
the trailer and sheared the springs off its left rear, locking tts wheels." Further they state in said paragraph,
"Immediately after the collision the Mecham car was
facing diagonally across the road, its front end projecting into the lane for down canyon traffic with consider-
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able debris in front of it in the down canyon lane (Exhibits "I" and "D''). The truck and trailer were off the
highway below the car with only the left front wheel
on the hard surfaced portion."
Defendants quote no citation from the record to
support their statements and have entirely ignored the
testimony presented that the tractor and trailer and the
automobile at the time they came to rest were hooked
together, the back end of the trailer sitting upon the front
end of the automobile and in the lane for up-canyon
traffic, and that subsequently the Chevrolet automobile
and the tractor and trailer were moved. Testimony to
this effect was given by both Mr. Carter and Mr. Ercanbrack, and that the automobile and tractor and trailer
were moved prior to the arrival of the investigating
officers at the scene of the accident. Defendants ignore
this phase of the testimony and their statement as to
what was broken or damaged by force of the impact
should be tempered by the knowledge that the removal
of the truck and trailer could have caused additional
damage and as to what that damage consisted of, there
is no evidence in the record. Defendants state at page
5 of their brief, in their statement of facts, "Carter also
testified the truck was moved after the accident, although
the undisputed physical evidence was that it could not
be moved without the use of a wrecker." Again defendants have failed to support their statement by any reference to the record. Of course, such a statement is untrue
since the testimony of both Carter and Ercanbrack was
that the truck must have been moved after the accident.
Both Carter and Ercanbrack testified that the pictures
shown to them showing the automobile separated from
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the tractor-trailer and the tractor-trailer down canyon,
did not represent the scene at the time they saw the
wreck immediately after the impact. (See supra, testimony of Ercanbrack and Carter).
Defendants, at page 5 of their statement of facts,
state: "On rebuttal, plaintiffs produced one Alfred
M. Carter, who plaintiff claimed was not discovered
until the weekend recess of the trial in January,
1952, although he had worked all during the period
in the same small group with plaintiff's father as a
fellow employee of Utah Construction Company at
the Geneva Steel Plant."
There is no evidence in the record to show what size
group Mr. Carter may have been working with or in what
size group plaintiff's father was working at the time he
and Mr. Carter were working for Utah Construction
Company, Geneva Steel Plant, or that they were working together all during this period. R. 81. The affadavit
of B. F. Romano reads as follows:
"B. F. Romano, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says: That he is a resident of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and over the age of twenty-one years;
that he was employed by the Defendants in the above
entitled action to investigate one Alfred M. Carter
of Orem, Utah and the testimony of said Carter
in the trial of the above entitled matter; that as a part
of his investigation he interviewed fellow employees
of Carter at the Utah Construction Company at the
Geneva Steel Plant; that one of said fellow employees of said Carter is the fA-ther of the plaintiE
above named, one Mr. Simmons, and that some
of the fellow employees of said Carter knew, or
had heard, that Plaintiff Flora Mecham, the daughter of said Simmons, was involved in a lawsuit
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arising out of the death of her husband in an automobile accident in Provo Canyon.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS ALLEN.

II.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL
MECHAM.

III.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS ALLEN.

Appellants assign as error No. 1 the failure of the
trial court to direct a verdict in their favor. The two
propositions, A and B, which they set forth will be
treated as one by respondents. Appellants apparent contension is that the uncontroverted physical evidence
in the. case demonstrates that appellants were not negligent and that Tom Mecham was negligent as a matter
of law. Appellants state in their brief, page 7, "**Oral
testimony to the contrary must yield to the undisputable
physical facts * *," and cite the Utah case of Haarstrich
v. O.S.L., 70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100, to support their statement. Respondents have no quarrel with the rule of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
law as set forth in the Haarstrich case. This court stated
in that case, page 104 P. 2d:

"It only need be stated here that the testimony
of Mr. Howard in that respect flies in the face of
uncontroverted physical facts and therefore is not
substantial evidence."
It would be but a waste of time to here repeat the testimony of the various witnesses which respondents set
forth in their statement of fact. The only conclusion
that can be arrived at after reading the testimony and
evidence is that there are few, if any, uncontroverted
facts in this case. The entire theory of respondents' case
is that when the tractor-trailer and Chevrolet automobile came to rest, the Chevrolet automobile was under
the trailer up against t~e back wheels, and on the
Mecham side of the highway. That subsequent to that
the tractor-trailer was moved down canyon from the
Chevrolet automobile and off to the side of the road before the investigating officers arrived at the scene. By
the officers own testimony it was 10-15 minutes after
they received the call before they arrived at the scene
of the accident. R. 320. When the officers did arrive
the injured people were already loaded in the ambulance.
R. 321. Appellants state at page 18 of their brief:

"The testimony of the investigating officers of
the Utah Highway Patrol, Evans and Clark, as to
the physical facts they found, testimony not even
attempted to be attacked by cross examination or
otherwise leads but to one conclusion: The Mecham
car was on the wrong side of the road when the
collision occurred. Under such circumstances that
is negligence as a matter of law."
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However, with reference to physical evidence, appellants
make no mention of the testimony of Warren Peay, a
flume walker of Utah Power & Light Co. who testified
that he saw and examined tire burns upon the surface of
the road up canyon from the Mecham Chevrolet automobile. That these marks were in the Mecham lane of
traffic and were made by dual tires. Further, Mr. Peay's
testimony was corroborated by the statements of W. 0.
Mecham, who testified to the same dual tire marks in the
Mecham lane of traffic. R. 127, 128, 223, Exhibit 7.
Appellants state at page 7 of their brief, "No one at
the trial was an actual eye witness able to describe how
the accident happened." Apparently appellants did not
even bother to read the record. The testimony of Mr.
Ercanbrack shows he was an eye witness. R. 236, 237.
Flora Mecham testified that she saw the tractor-trailer
immediately prior to the impact. R. 269, 270 .. Arthur
Allen, one of the appellants, testified as an eye witness to
the wreck. R. 363, 364, 365. The statements of Mr.
Ercanbrack and Apellant Arthur Allen are in direct
conflict as to how the accident happened, and the testimony of all three of these eye witnesses was presented
to the jury.
Appellants spend a good portion of their brief attempting to discredit the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack.
At page 14 of their brief appellants state that Mr. Ercanbrack testified he could stop his car in one foot when
going 35 m.p.h. Of course such is not true and Mr.
Ercanbrack made the statement only to give the impression that he could stop very quickly-his full testimony
so indicates,-R. 245:
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"Q. Under what distance can you stop your
car going at thirty five miles an hour?
''A. I could stop it then in one foot.
"Q. Have you ever tried that?
"A. Yes, sir. Lots of times.
"Q. You say when you are driving an automobile at thirty five miles an hour you can stop
in one foot?
"A. I can lock all four wheels. I've done it lots
of times when fellows was about to run into them.
"Q. And you say when you were going about
thirty five miles an hour you can stop in one foot?
"A. I've done it when the roads was dry. At
least, I think it was about a foot."

At page 14 of appellants brief they state Mr. Ercanbrack testified that the Mecham car and the Allen truck
stopped r1ght at the point where they came together.
The record is as follows: (R. 250)
"Q. I asked you, Mr. Ercanbrack, if the twovehicles moved any distance on the highway, any
distance down -canyon after they came together, or
up-canyon, or what did they do?
"A. Well, they hit so quick I don't think they
moved very far.
"Q. How far do you think they moved?
"A. I think both of them had to stop.
"Q. Well, did they or didn't they?
"A. They had stopped.
"Q. They stopped right at the point where they
came together?
"A. Well, as near as I can tell they did.
"Q. And you saw them, is that right?
"A. I sat right there in the car and seen it.
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"Q. You say some men lifted up the side of the
trailer so they could pull the car out?
"A. They helped to."

Appellants conclude that Mr. Ercanbrack's testimony is not credible because--"Under such conditions,
the vehicles would not stop as they came together.
Either the truck would drag the car or the car would be
thrust back from a point of impact by the additional
weight of the truck." (Appellants' brief, page 15). Appellants fail to consider the factor of braking power on
the tractor-trailer and the effect that would have with
reference to the forward motion of the tractor-trailer
being of greater or lesser intensity than the forward
motion of the Chevrolet automobile. The dual tire burns
on the highway establish that the driver of the truck
applied his brakes. With what force the two vehicles
came together is a question not answered in the record,
except by the verdict of the jury in which they held
appellants to be negligent in the operation of the tractortrailer and Tom Mecham free from any negligence
in the operation of his Chevrolet automobile.
Appellants question Mr. Ercanbrack's ability to see
the accident and quote Mr. Ercanbrack as saying the
tractor-trailer was 75 feet up the road when he saw it.
(Appellant's brief, page 12-15). Mr. Ercanbrack did
not get out and measure the distances, so he could tell
just how far he was from the tractor-trailer. As any
reasonable person knows, such testimony is only an estimation. The driver of the truck, Appellant Arthur Allen,
stated he saw the Mecham car when it was about 100150 feet down the canyon. R. 363. If such is a correct
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estimation, then Mr. Ercanbrack must have been somewhat farther down canyon when the tractor-trailer first
came into view. One thing is certain, if the driver of
the truck could see the Mecham car 100-150 feet down
the straightaway of the canyon, and how much further
he could see is not known, then certainly drivers coming in the opposite direction could see the Allen tractortrailer at least 100-150 feet up-canyon. Whatever the
distances were, it is apparent that both Appellant Arthur
Allen, driver of the tractor-trailer, and Mr. Ercanbrack
could see the happening of the events that took place.
Appellants state at page 14 of their brief that Ercanbrack testified that the men at the scene of the accident
lifted up the tractor and trailer weighing 8% tons and
pulled the Mecham car back from under it. Of course,
Mr. Ercanbrack made no such statement and appellants'
citations to the record do not support their statement.
Mr. Ercanbrack's statement in this regard is as follows:
(R. 250, 251)
"Q. You say some men lifted up the side of
the trailer so they could pull the car out?
"A. They helped to.
"Q. How many men did that?
"A. Well, I didn't count them, but they was just
as thick as they could get around that car."

Appellants apparently intend that the court gain
the impression that a group of men lifted the tractor and
trailer weighing 17,140 lbs. completely off the ground.
The statement of Mr. Ercanbrack is entirely clear and
logical, whereas appellants attempt at construction is
false and deceitful.
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At page 17 of their brief appellants attempt to dispute the testimony of W. 0. Mecham when he stated
th~t he saw dual tire burns on the highway up-canyon
from the Chevrolet automobile. Appellants attempt to
make much of the fact that W. 0. Mecham did not
describe these marks when his deposition was taken
prior to the trial. However, Mr. Mecham explained the
discrepancies as follows: (R. 141, 142)
"Q. Now I will ask you * * * if you didn't tell
Mr. Billings that you did not observe any brake
marks or tire marks of any kind at the time you
were there? * * *"
"A. That was below the car that I had reference
to. On this side of the car.

•*•

"Q. Will you follow me, sir, and do you see your

answer there when you said 'no' * * *."
"A. If I understood the question it was on this
side of the car that I had reference to."
Of course appellants fail to mention that Mr. Peay,
corroborating the testimony of Mr. Mecham, testified to
these same dual tire marks. R. 223, 224.
Appellants at page 15 of their brief state, "Nor could
a truck with its driveshaft broken back up under its own
power. (See Exhibit 5 and 6) ." Appellants attempted
to convince the jury that when the tractor-trailer came
to rest it was in such a condition that it could not be
moved by its own power, but only by means of a
wrecker, and therefore the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack
that the tractor-trailer backed up and was moved prior
to the arrival of the police officers is not true. There is
nothing in the record to show whether the driveshaft
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broke as a result of the impact or as a result of the driver
attempting to move the truck under its own power. The
evidence was presented to the jury whether to believe
plaintiff's presentation of the case or the defendants, and
they chose to believe the plaintiffs. Plaintiff does not
dispute the testimony of Mr. Hales as to the mechanical
condition of the tractor-trailer when he saw it. The
difficulty is that Mr. Hales cannot tell us when or how
the driveshaft broke. Appellants' logic is based only on
facts they want to believe and not the factual evidence
presented at the trial.
This is not a case for the application of the rule set
forth in the Haarstrich case, but rather the rule laid down
in SEYBOLD V. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., No.
7641,--Utah--, 239 P. 2d 174, 177, wherein the court
stated:
"If there is any substantial competent evidence
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably
could make the finding, it should stand."
Or, as was stated in HORSLEY V. ROBINSON, 186
p. 2d 592, 595:
"The question of what were the facts and where
is the preponderance of the evidence is for the jury
and not for the court to determine. Our problem is
only to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to sustain the verdict. In doing so our standard is:
Could a reasonable mind be convinced by the evidence of the necessary facts to support the verdict?
If so, it must be sustained."
Based upon the record there is substantial evidence
upon which the jury found for plaintiffs and, therefore,
the verdict should be affirmed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL MECHAM.
In support of appellants' second assignment of error
appellants' cite as error Instruction No. 11. In the first
place appellants did not make a proper objection to
Instruction No. 11 at the time the instruction was presented to them by the court. Appellants objection is as
follows: (R. 473)
"Defendants except to the court's Instruction No.
11 wherein the jury are told that they may consider
in connection with all the facts and circumstances
a presumption that the deceased was exercising due
and proper care for the protection of his person and
the preservation of his life, upon the grounds that
under the evidence introduced in the case all of the
evidence showed that the impact between the two
vehicles occurred on the defendants side of said highway, in their lane of traffic, and that in the light of
the undisputed physical evidence, said presumption disappeared and the jury should not have been
told that they could consider said presumption in
their deliberations."
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires that the ground of the objection be stated
distinctly. Said rule reads in part,
"* * * No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless
he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of
an instruction, a party must state distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection.* * *"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

The rule provides that the Supreme Court may in its
discretion review alleged error of the trial court in the
giving or failing to give an instruction even though no
objection is made. However, exceptional circumstances
must be shown to provide the court with this authority.
The Appellants in this case have shown nothing by way
of exceptional circumstances for the "requirements of
justice" which would allow this court to now consider
an instruction to which no proper objection was made.
It is quite obvious that the appellants set forth an entirely
different legal concept in their brief than the one they
made to the trial court regarding instruction No. 11. At
page 25 of their brief appellants state the instruction is
erroneous,-"In the first place, because it does not correctly state the law of the State of Utah with respect to
the presumption of due care on the part of the deceased."
Particular reference is made by appellants to that part
of Instruction No. 11,-"You are instructed that, until
the contrary is proven, there is a presumption* * *."This
court had upheld such words in this type of instruction.
See DAVIS V. DENVER & RIO GRANDE W. RY Co.,
45 Utah 1, 9, 142 P. 705:

"It is a presumption of law that every man
exercises due care for his own safety when in a place
of danger, and the presumption is that the deceased
did so at the time and place when and where it is
claimed he met his death. The court further instructs
you that the plaintiff need not affirmatively prove
that the deceased looked and listened for the train.
The presumption is that he did so, and the burden
of proof that he did not is upon the defendant
railroad company, and it must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."
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But, whatever may be the conclusion of the court regarding the use of particular words, it is Respondents' contention that the giving of such instruction was not prejudicial error for the reasons hereafter stated.
Secondly, on page 27 of Appellants' brief they state
that the giving of any instruction with respect to the
presumption was prejudicial error. Respondents contend
that the giving of such an instruction with respect to
presumption of due care was not prejudicial error. Assuming that the instruction may be erroneous, it is
shown conclusively by the other instructions in the case
and by recent decisions of this court that such an
instruction is not prejudicial. Said instruction was, in
effect, nullified by the giving of the following instruction, portions of which are quoted here. Instruction No.
2 (R. 455, 456):
"You are instructed that the burden of proof
is upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the material allegations of her complaint before she is entitled to recover thereon, and
you are instructed that this burden of proof is likewise upon her respecting each and every count contained in her complaint before she is entitled to
rcover on any one of said counts."
Instruction No. 2, R. 457-458:
"You are instructed that the burden of proof
is upon the defendants to prove their first affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence; namely,
that Thomas Udell Mecham was himself guilty of
contributory negligence as that defense relates to
claim of Flora Mecham as his widow and in her
representative capacity on behalf of the surviving
minor children, and in connection with this matter
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you are instructed that such a defense, if proven, as
aforesaid, is a bar to the recovery by Flora Mecham,
as his widow and as the representative of said minor
children, for the death of Thomas Udell Mecham;
and in the event that the defendants have sustained
that burden of proof then in this respect it would
be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, Flora S. Mecham,
guardian ad litem.
"You are likewise instructed that the burden of
proof is upon the defendants to prove their second
affirmative defense before they are entitled to the
benefit of such defense; namely, that the negligence
of Thomas Udell Mecham was the sole, proximate
cause of the collision and his resulting death, and
in this connection you are instructed that said defense, if proven, is a complete bar to a recovery by
FloraS. Mecham as his widow and as the representative of these minor children for any loss or damage
they sustained by reason of the death of Thomas
Udell Mecham.
"You are further instructed that the defense
of contributory negligence alleged by said defendants
respecting the conduct of the deceased, Thomas
Udell Mecham, is not a bar, even though proven by
a preponderance of the evidence, to a recovery by
Flora Mecham and said minor children for their own
personal injuries and damage, provided, however,
that they in each instance of damage claimed by
them have sustained the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence respecting their separate
counts as heretofore mentioned.
"Respecting the last part of the preceding ininstruction and by way of explanation thereof, you
are instructed that a passenger, such as the widow
and children herein mentioned, are not chargeable
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in their. right to recover by the contributory negligence, if any, upon the part of their driver of the
automobile in which they are riding, even though if
he is contributorily negligent it proximately caused
or contributed to the accident, unless, however, his
contributory negligence was the sole, proximate
cause of their injury and resulting damage, which
event would defeat all causes of action by these
plaintiffs."
Instruction No. 3, R. 458:
"Contributory negligence means that a person
injured has proximately contributed to such injury
by his want of ordinary care, so that except for
such want of ordinary care on his part the injury
would not have resulted.
"Negligence means the failure to do what a
reasonably prudent person would have done under
the circumstances of the situation, or doing what
such person under existing circumstances would
not have done. The essence of the fault may lie
in acting or omitting to act. The duty is dictated and
measured by the exigencies of the occasion."
Instruction No. 4, R. 459:
"You are instructed that the law did not require
defendants driver, ·Arthur Allen, to anticipate or
guard against anything which could not reasonably
be expected and did not ·require him to regulate
his conduct with reference to any conduct on the
part of Thomas Udell Mecham not reasonably to
be expected, nor did the law require defendants
driver to be extraordinarily alert or to foresee all
that can be seen by looking backward after the
accident has happened. In other words, he was not
under a duty to foresee what he might at this time
be able to see by looking back after the accident,
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nor was he required to use extraordinary caution
for the avoidance of an accident which he could not
have expected under the circumstances."
"You are further instructed that defendants
driver Arthur Allen had a right to assume, unless
put on notice to the contrary, that the operator of
any automobile approaching from the opposite
direction, in this instance Thomas Mecham, would
approach in such a manner as to keep his automobile
under control, approach at a reasonable and prudent
speed having due regard to the surface of the highway, curve and other conditions, and that such approaching automobile would not carelessly or negligently be permitted to get out of control or across
the center of the highway."
Instruction No. 5, R. 459:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the
deceased Thomas Mecham upon approaching defendants truck to remain upon his right or proper
side of the highway and to keep his car under control
to avoid turning or otherwise negligently colliding
with defendants' truck and semi-trailer; that is to
say, it was his duty to remain on the right side of
the highway until both vehicles had completely
passed each other.
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence that
the deceased, Thomas Mecham, at the time of and
immediately before said collision, drove his vehicle
across the center line of said highway and into
the defendants lane of traffic, then the said Thomas
Mecham was negligent."
Instruction No. 7, R. 460:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the
deceased Thomas Mecham to observe approaching
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vehicles lawfully upon the highway and the existing condition, such as any hazard or curve in the
road, at the scene of the accident and to remain
in the lane of traffic designed for the use of eastbound vehicles. It is no legal excuse for the driver
of an automobile to fail to look, or to observe the
existing conditions, when by reasonable care such
could have been seen, and if you find from the
evidence that Thomas Mecham either negligently
failed to look or negligently failed to see existing
conditions, including the approach of defendants
truck, when he should have done so in the exercise
of reasonable care, and that such negligence, if any,
proximately contributed in any degree to cause the
collision, then plaintiff is chargeable with that negligence as I have heretofore indicated by these instructions."
Instruction No. 9, R. 461, 462:
"You are instructed that at the time of the
collision between the Chevrolet automobile driven
by Thomas Mecham and the truck driven by Arthur
Allen, there were four persons in the front seat
of the Mecham automobile. If you find from the
evidence that such conditions crowded the driver
of the Chevrolet, obstructed his view, or impaired
his ability to operate the vehicle with due regard
to the type of highway and conditions of traffic,
and that such crowding, obstruction or impairment
proximately contributed in any way to the collision,
then Thomas Mecham was negligent."
It would be unreasonable to conclude that the jury
could find anything left in Instruction No. 11 upon which
to consider relative issues of negligence as pertaining to
both plaintiff and defendant. The instructions above
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quoted specifically cover the very essence of defendants
defense and argument of contributory negligence, to the
effect that the decedent Thomas Mecham crossed the
center line of the highway violating the law therein and
in such was negligence. The court's instruction specifically states that if the jury finds such to be true that
the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on any of their
counts.
Mr. Justice Wade in the recent case of TUTTLE
V. PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS COMPANY,--Utah--, 242 P. 2d 764, 770, states:
"Here the jury could reasonably find from the
evidence that decedent was driving his car from the
south and turned his car suddenly and without
warning into the course of the tractor-trailer when
it was too late to avoid an accident and in so doing
he did not use reasonable care for his own safety.
So the presumption was thereby destroyed and instructing the jury thereon could only confuse rather
than enlighten them, but this was not prejudicial.
The court merely instructed that there was a presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary
and that question should not give the jury trouble
although it was a question for the court and not
the jury to decide. The jury was properly instructed
that the defendant had the burden of persuading
them that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, which is greater burden than that which the
presumption would place on them had it not been
destroyed, so this presumption was not prejudicial
for as Mr. Justice Lummus of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts once said, it would be like
a 'handkerchief thrown over something also covered
by a blanket.' "
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Mr. Justice Lummus, in the case of Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 196, 189 NE 4143, aptly summed up
the situation as we have in this case when he stated:
"When the statute casts upon the defendant
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, it did everything for the plaintiff that a
presumption of his due care could do, and according to most authorities on the subject of presumptions it did more. The statutory presumption of
due care, therefore, is wholly overshadowed by that
burden of proof, and can have no practical effect.
If it never had been created, or should be abolished,
neither party would be a whit better or the worse.
The statutory presumption of due care is like a
handk~rchief thrown over something covered by a
blanket. Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 563'; Board
of Water Commissioners of City of New London
v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 640, 74 Atl. 938. For this
reason, if the burden of proof is correctly stated to
the jury, there can be no reversible error in dealing
with the presumption of due care, whether the
judge adopts what seems the better course of refusing to mention it at all, or, as the judge did in this
case, indulges in what must needs be an academic
discussion of its theoretical operation; and this, no
matter whether that discussion conforms to the true
theory of presumptions or not, since the simple
ground that has been stated requires the overruling
of these exceptions, and we- are dealing with a socalled presumption which has no operative effect and
only a verbal or theoretical existence, a discussion
of the working of genuine presumptions would be
superfluous."
As was stated by Professor Edward M. Morgan
in "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions" 44
Harvard Law Review, 906 at page 908:
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"If one could imagine a jury man critically
examining such a charge, consciously analyzing his
own mental processes and then attempting to make
an accurate application of the charge to the case in
hand, one might well say that nothing but confusion would result, the belief, however, that the jury
in the usual trial really understands and seriously
endeavors to apply the details of the judge's instructions can hardly outlive a few years of experience
on the trial bench or at the trial bar. The net effect
of most of these rulings, it is ventured, is to throw
to the jury many issues which might otherwise be
determined by the judge, whether this end justifies
the means depends largely upon one's views of the
value and function of the jury."

See also: "Instructing the Jury upon P.r.esumptions
and Burden of Proof" 47 Harvard Law Review 59:
"Behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit.
That which is crooked cannot be made straight.
These words of the ancient realist might well furnish
the text for any discourse upon charges to the jury
in the vast majority of American courts. No extended experience at the bar or upon the trial bench
is required to produce a vivid realization that only
in the exceptional case is the jury decisively influenced by the judge's instructions and in still rarer
instances is its determination based upon the allocation of the burden of persuasion."
Whatever argument appellants may set forth in
their brief, it is apparent that the giving of Instruction
No. 11 by the trial judge could in no way constitute prejudicial error in this case. Defendants argument in
this regard was presented to the trial court in its motion
for a new trial and the trial judge upon listening to the
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argument of counsel denied their motion for a new
trial upon this ground. R. 92.
III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.
Appellants at page 30 of their brief state: "It is
submitted that defendants were the unwitting victims of
a carefully prepared and executed surprise." There is
no evidence whatsoever to substantiate Appellants contention as will be pointed out in this argument.
Appellants again at page 30 state: "Thereupon
plaintiff presented as a purported rebuttal witness, one
Alfred M. Carter." Mr. Carter was presented on rebuttal
by plaintiffs and there was no objection taken to his
testifying as a rebuttal witness and the court granted
plaintiffs the right to examine him as such. R. 422.
Appellants state at page 31 of their brief, "By a
curious coincidence, he (Carter) did not see or talk
to anyone about the accident until a year and one-half
later when on the Saturday night after the plaintiff
had rested he was visited by Mr. L. S. McCullough, one
of the attorneys for plaintiff. R. 425-426." Of course, this
statement of appellants is not correct. Mr. Carter's testimony in this respect is as follows: (R. 425)
"Q. Mr. Carter, when was your first talk with
counsel for the plaintiff, or any one of them, about
this accident?
A. Saturday."
(R. 426)
"Q. Was that the first time you had talked
to anyone, any of the attorneys involved in the
action?
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A. It was Saturday.
Q. This last Saturday?
A. Saturday, yes."
It is apparent by reading the record that Mr. Carter
never meant that he had not talked to anyone concerning the accident, but that the first time he talked with
counsel for plaintiff was on Saturday during the trial.
Counsel for appellant would be aware of this if they
had read the record, for at page 439 on their crossexamination of Mr. Carter they state:
"Q. Did you discuss the accident with anybody?
"A. With my wife and folks when I came back.
Q. Did you discuss the accident with anybody
at the scene?
A. "No."

Again at page 31 of their brief appellants state, "Yet
all during the intervening period between the accident
and the time of Mr. McCullough's visit he had been working in close association with one Simmons, father of
plaintiff, in a group of construction employees at the
Geneva Steel Plant. R. 81." Appellants cite "R. 81"
the affidavit of Mr. B. F. Romano, a private detective
who was employed by defendants to investigate Mr.
Carter, to support their statement. However, his affidavit
does not support their statement in this particular-Mr.
Romano states, R. 81:
"B. F. Romano being first duly sworn, deposes
and says: That he is a resident of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and over the age of twenty-one years;
that he was employed by the defendants in the
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above entitled action to investigate one Alfred M.
Carter of Orem, Utah, and the testimony of said
Carter in the trial of the above entitled case; that as
part of his investigation he interviewed fellow employees of Carter at the Utah Construction Company
at the Geneva Steel Plant; that one of said fellow
employees of said Carter is the father of the plaintiff
above named, one Mr. Simmons, and that some of
the fellow employees of said Carter, knew or had
heard that plaintiff Flora Mecham, the daughter of
said Simmons, was involved in a lawsuit arising
out of the death of her husband in an automobile
accident in Provo Canyon."

It is .apparent that appellants statement, that Mr.
Simmons was, "during the intervening period," working
in close association with Mr. Carter, is fallacious. Mr.
Carter identified to the best of his knowledge his fellow
employees at the time of the accident and Mr. Simmons
was not one of them. R. 432.
Appellants state at page 31 of their brief, "Defendant J. H. Allen came into the case in June, 1951,
when the insurance company withdrew and the amended
complaint was filed. His counsel were handicapped by
a year's delay in investigation, * * *." Of course, counsel
only had from June until January, 1952, in which to prepare their case, just a little over six months. The time
hardly seems adequate.
Again at page 31 of their brief appellants state,
"Interrogatories were served on plaintiff asking the
names of the witnesses (R. 11-12). Plaintiff replies with
a weasling answer naming some, but expressly excluding those known to her attorneys, her father-in-law or
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her brother-in-law. R. 13. Defendants were the~ forced
to secure a court order directing plaintiff to furnish those
names she had excluded. R. 21." Appellants contention
appears to be that respondent exercised bad faith in
answering the interrogatories, however, such is not the
case. Defendants in their interrogatories at R. 11 requested that the plaintiffs give them the names of any
witnesses to the accident "within the knowledge of plaintiff or their representatives." Plaintiffs, not wishing to
be caught in defendant's trap, under the guise of "representatives" made their answers to the interrogatories
and stated, "I am not aware of what information my
father-in-law or brother-in-law or my attorneys have
gathered since the date of this accident." R. 13. The
court should be aware that plaintiff's attorneys reside
in Salt Lake City. That the plaintiff, Flora Mecham,
was residing in Midway, Utah. That her father-in-law
was living in Wallsburg and the brother-in-law was
living in Heber. Defendant put in a motion requesting
that the plaintiff gives the names of all witnesses within the knowledge of "plaintiffs attorneys, father-in-law
and brother-in-law." R. 16. The court upon hearing
defendants motion ordered that the attorneys for plaintiffs give any information they may have regarding witnesses. However, they expressly excluded from the
order the brother-in-law and father-in-law, and did not
require that a trip be made from Salt Lake or from
Midway to contact the brother-in-law in Heber or the
father-in-law at Wallsburg as had been requested by
defendants. R. 21.
Appellants again state at page 31 of their brief,
"The supplemental answer (R.22) named Ercanbrack and White, two of plaintiff's principal wit-
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nesses at the trial of the action, as the eye witness,
but did not mention Carter."
Carter was not even known at that time by the plaintiffs or their counsel and, furthermore, Mr. Carter was
not an eye witness to the accident as his testimony expressly shows. Mr. Carter testified that he heard the
accident but he never testified that he was an eye witness to the accident. R. 424. Appellants at page 32 of
their brief quote a portion of the deposition of W. 0.
Mecham. In order that a complete understanding may
be made of Mr. Mecham's testimony, I quote here a
slightly larger portion of his deposition. At page 67,
line 22 of the deposition:
"Q. All right, who is William White?

A. He's a fellow from-! don't know whether
that would be the Steel Plant, called the Steel Plant,
or would be on the Springville road. He works in
Provo.
Q. I see. And did he see the accident?

A. Yes. sir.
Q. And where was he?
A. Well, he was going up the canyon. He was
either in front of Ercanbrack or behind him. I
couldn't say."

Appellants in some rather startling deductions state
at page 32 of their brief:
"Now, William White did live on the Springville
road, R. 190, and Mr. Carter did work at the Steel
Plant, thus, it is apparent that W. 0. Mecham knew
of an eye witness who worked at the Steel Plant, and
plaintiffs father must have known."
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Appellants reasoning in this regard is beyond comprehension. A simple reading of the record (R. 190) of
Mr. White's testimony sufficiently conveys the meaning
which Mr. Mecham had in mind,
"Q. And where did you live when you talked
to Mr. Colton?
A. If I remember right, on the Springville Road.
Q. Down by that yard where these wrecked
cars are; is that where you were living at that time?
A. I think so.
Q. And that is just south of the County Old
Folk's Home?
A. That's right sir.
Q. Near Ironton there?
A. Yes sir."

Appellants have forgotten that a Steel Plant is also
located at Ironton on the Springville road and that Mr.
White lived on the Springville road near an old wrecking yard. Furthermore, as has been stated previously,
Mr. Carter was not an eye witness to the accident.
Appellants state at page 32 of their brief, "Any
person who had been a witness to an accident
where a man was killed and others were seriously
injured, would be likely to discuss the matter with
his fellow employees. It is stretching incredulity
that plaintiff's father, Simmons, did not hear of Mr.
Carter's connection with the accident if, in fact, he
had been there."
Appellant's statement is false speculation. There is
nothing in the record to indicate when Mr. Simmons
commenced working as a fellow employee of Carter,
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and certainly this Court cannot speculate on the length
of time Mr. Carter may have been inclined to discuss
this accident with anyone, including fellow employees.
Appellants at page 22 of their brief cite the cases of
Delmas v. Martin and Whitfield v. Delericant, California cases. Appellants rely upon these cases for the
proposition that they were not aware of the circumstances or state of facts to which the witness Carter
testified. Mr. Ercanbrack testified that at the time the
Chevrolet automobile and the tractor-trailer came to
rest immediately after the impact that the Chevrolet
automobile was underneath the back end of the trailer
and the trailer was upon the Mecham side of the highway. Appellants Arthur Allen and their witness Dale
Mousley testified that the tractor and trailer and Chevrolet automobile immediately after the impact were
separated by some 50 or 60 feet. Mr. Carter's testimony was submitted on rebuttal to rebut the testimony
of Mr. Arthur Allen and Dale Mousley and to corroborate the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack. Certainly
appellants cannot claim that they were unaware of the
state of facts to which Mr. Ercanbrack would testify.
By their own brief (page 32) they admit the taking of
Mr. Ercanbrack's deposition, and his deposition as well
as his testimony at the trial of the case are the same in
regards to the location of the tractor-trailer and the
Chevrolet automobile immediately after the impact.
Appellants at page 33 of their brief under sub
argument B, "Newly Discovered Evidence," state: "Un. til Carter testified, there was no credible evidence placing the car or truck in any other place than the photo-
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graphs and the investigating officers placed them. Carter's testimony, if believed, raised a new issue of fact."
Mr. Ercanbrack testified for respondents as hereinabove stated as to the location of the tractor-trailer and
the Chevrolet automobile immediately after the impact.
Mr. Carter's testimony was merely corroborating the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack for Mr. Carter placed the
Chevrolet automobile under the back end of the trailer
up against the back wheels in the same way that Mr.
Ercanbrack had explained it. See R. 258, 427, 428. Appellants statement that Carter's testimony raised a new
issus of fact is wrong. Appellants were aware of Mr. Ercanbrack's testimony long prior to the trial therefore
how could they claim surprise when Mr. Carter testifies
to substantially the same thing.
Appellants submitted as part of their motion for
new trial, affidavits of Louis Washburn, Bert Nichols and
Keith Taggert and appellants state at page 34 of their
brief,
"All of these proposed witnesses would testify
that the vehicles immediately after the accident were
at the places shown in the photographs and as testified by the investigating officers and not as testified by Carter."
Respondents admit that these witnesses could testify
that at the time they arrived at the scene of the accident the vehicles were in the position as shown by the
investigating officers. However, it is shown by the
testimony that the investigating officers did not arrive at
the scene of the accident for some 20 minutes or more
after the impact and that the injured people were al-
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ready loaded in the ambulance when they arrived. It
should be noted that Burt Nichols, Louis Washburn,
Allen Smith and James Thompson were traveling up
Provo Canyon at the time of the accident; that they
were passed by the Highway Patrol as they were going
up the canyon, therefore, they could not have arrived
as soon as the Highway Patrol did which was only after
the ambulance had completed loading the injured people. R. 84, 87. They also stated in their affidavits that
they parked some 12 to 15 cars down canyon from the
scene of the accident, indicating there were quite a number of cars ahead of them. R. 84, 87. Hence, if these
affiants did not arrive at the scene of the accident until
after the investigating officers arrived, they could not
have been there at the time Mr. Carter was there. However, appellants state at page 34 of their brief, "It is
submitted that their testimony, if believed would completely discredit the testimony of Carter and would furnish evidence on the point not in issue in the case in
chief." The testimony of Mr. Carter coincides with the
testimony of the eye witness, Mr. Ercanbrack. (R. 258,
427, 428) There is no new evidence that these affiants
could inject into the case as their testimony coincides
with the testimony submitted by appellant Arthur Allen, the driver of the tractor-trailer, and Dale Mousley
who was a apssenger with Mr. Allen. (R 361, 362, 363,
389, 390) Their testimony was submitted to the jury and
the jury chose not to believe it. Appellants admit the
principles of law as set forth in Klopenstine v. Hayes and
Trimble v. Union Pacific which they cite at page 35
of their brief, however, they state at page 35,
"This principle defendants do not deny. But it is
submitted, this case is quite a different situation.
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The proposed evidence is to shed new light on an issue which was not raised until Carter testified on
rebuttal at the close of the trial."
Again appellants talk about "light on a new issue" that
was never raised until Mr. Carter testified. This is
unbelievable in view of the record of Mr. Ercanbrack's
testimony in which he testified as to the position of the
tractor-trailor and the Chevrolet automobile immediately after they came to rest. Mr. Carter's testimony is
only corroborating the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack
and rebutting the testimony of Mr. Arthur Allen, the
driver.
Appellants state at pages 35 and 36, " * * * but from
all the plaintiffs witnesses that defendants were able to
discover and interview or subject to examination by deposition there was no issue as to the locale of the accident
or the vehicles immediately thereafter." How appellants
can make such a perverted statement is beyond reason.
Mr. Ercanbrack's testimony is clear and· concise on this
point. Mr. Ercanbrack's testimony as to the location of
the vehicles and their position is set forth amply in plaintiff's statement of fact, however, perhaps a few quotations from the record would be propitious at this point.
At R. 256:"Q. Now, Mr. Ercanbrack, I show you what has
been introduced in evidence as plaintiffs Exhibit C,
which purports to be a view of the highway approaching the curve. Do you recognize that picture
or that view?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have seen that picture before, I take

it?
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A. I don't know whether I have seen it before
or not. Maybe they showed it to me in this deposition they took.
Q. Well, would that be a correct view, or a
fair or correct view of the area of the highway
approaching the place where the accident occurred?
A. I believe it would. It's up in there quite
aways where it occurred, as I recollect, by the two
trees and the stump.
Q. And I show you plaintiff's exhibit B and I
will ask you if that is also a correct view or fair representation of the view of the highway where the
accident occurred aproaching and going up-canyon?
A. It is.
R. 257.
"Q. Now, Mr. Ercanbrack, I show you Exhibit
B. Do you recognize the automobile appearing in
that photograph? That is if you were looking up the
canyon? The camera was held down-canyon from
that automobile.
A. I do not. That picture was not taken while
I was there.
Q. Do you see anything similar to the car in that
picture. and the Mecham automobile as you saw it
at the time of the accident?
A. Oh, yes, there is a few-it was broke up in a
way but it wasn't in th~t position.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
this car shown in Exhibit D is the Mecham automobile?
A. I do.
R. 258
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"Q. And does this photograph, Exhibit D, show
the position of the Mecham automobile when you
observed it at the scene?
A. No. sir.
Q.
A.
much.
nected

In what way doesn't it.
Because the hind end is around there too
It should be more like that. It should be conup with this trailer here.

Q. You say that the trailer here should be connected up with the car that appears in the picture?
A. Pretty close to the radiator of this car so
you could see it. This car should be around like this.
It hit in that kind of a position and it was a little bit
too far for me to pass."
The testimony of Louis Washburn, Bert Nichols,
James Thompson and Allen Smith is purely cumulative
testimony of witnesses which the defendants Allen knew
existed prior to the trial. Allen Smith, a cousin of Arthur Allen and a nephew of J. H. Allen, was at the scene
of the accident with Burt Nichols. Bert Nichols stated
in his sworn statement that he saw Arthur Allen at the
scene of the accident; that he had talked with Dale
Mousley, a brother-in-law of Arthur Allen subsequent
to the day of the accident while doing work for Dale
Mousley and that he knew about the trial of the case
when it was first set for going to trial. R. 84. Louis
Washburn stated he and Burt Nichols and Allen Smith
walked up to the scene of the accident and talked with
Arthur Allen and Dale Mousley; that he has known
Arthur Allen for at least 10 years; that Dale Mousley
talked with Louis Washburn prior to the trial and Dale
Mousley knew at that time that Burt Nichols and Allen
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Smith were at the scene of the wreck at the time it
occurred; that they were at the scene of the accident
and talked to him. R. 87. Respondents were unable to
secure the affidavits of Allen Smith, Burdett Jensen and
Keith Taggart, however, they talked with all three.
Their antagonism however made it impossible for respondents to secure an affidavit from them but Allen
Smith stated that he saw Burdett Jensen, brother-inlaw of Keith Taggart, at the scene of the accident. That
Allen Smith the cousin of Arthur Allen and nephew of
J. H. Allen, subsequent to the accident, talked to Burdett
Jensen in Draper, Utah; that Allen Smith was known
by the defendants to be at the scene of the accident
shortly after it occurred; that the defendents Allen have
talked with said Allen Smith about the accident on several occasions during the interval since the accident; that
J. H. Allen was aware of the fact that Burdett Jensen
and Keith Taggart were at the scene of the accident
shortly thereafter and J. H. Allen prior to the trial came
to the barn of the Jensen farm and talked to Burdett
Jensen about the accident and about Burdett Jensen
being at the accident. That J. H. Allen was again at
the Jensen farm subsequent to the date of the trial.
R. 91. It is apparent that the testimony of these affiants
would be merely cumulative; that there are no new
issues involved by reason of Carter's testimony; that
respondents were perfectly aware prior to the trial of
the testimony affiants would give and yet they never
attempted to secure any of their testimony to be presented to the jury. The trial court upon hearing defendants motion for a new trial and upon reading the
affidavits which they had submitted denied defendants'
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motion for a new trial. R. 92. As this court has stated
in numerous cases, and more recently in Marshall v.
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. 221 P. 2d 868, 869:
"The granting or· denying of a motion for a new
trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
When a trial court grants a new trial we will not
disturb its action unless it is manifestly appartent
that the court has abused its discretion. It is also
true as this court is well aware, that when a trial
court has denied a motion for a new trial, that this
court on appeal will not upset the lower court's order
unless it is manifestly apparent that there has been
an abuse of discretion. See also, Moser v. Z. C. M. I.,
197 P. 2d, King v. Union Pacific RR Co. 212 P. 2d
692; also State v. Cooper, 201 P. 2d 764; see also
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P 2d 708;
Klopenstine v. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712, Trimble
v. Union Pacific Stages, 105, Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674;
see also State v. Moore, 41 Utah 247, 126 P. 322, Annotated Cases 1915 C-976, also Greco v. Gentile,
88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155."
In Moser v. Z. C. M. I., 197 P. 2d 136 at page 139,
the court states,
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not contend otherwise) that the question of granting or denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. Wade v.
Union Pacific RR Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; Van
Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 P.
50; Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah
284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bow:q Livestock Co.,
74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. Logan City, 89
Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule applies whether
the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evi-
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dence or upon newly discovered evidence. See cases
above cited and Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co. 55
Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53
P. 2d 1155; Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105
Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674. This court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court.
James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 2
NCCA 782. We do not ordinarily interfere in rulings of the trial court in either granting or denying
a motion for a new trial, and unless abuse of, or
failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the trial
judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial
judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v.
Moyle at al, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; Wade v. Union
Pac. RR Co. (supra); Utah State Nat'l Bank v.
Livingston, (supra); Clark v. Los Angeles & SLR
Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble v. Union
Pacific Stages, (supra); see also Harrison v. Sutter
Street Railway Co., 116 Cal 156, 161, 47 P. 1019,
1020."
The lower court considered that the counter affidavits filed by plaintiffs fully and satisfactorily explained
matters set forth in the affidavits filed by defendants.
Further quoting from the Moser case at page 142 P. 2d:
"As was said in Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah
347, 57 P. 2d 708, 722: 'In a case such as this where
the facts are to be proved by the observations of a
number of witnesses, the verdict cannot be lightly
set aside to permit more witnesses to testify, for new
witnesses might continue to be discovered over a
long period of time.
"And again: 'It is only under very special circumstances because of the quality or type of propos·ed evidence and where it makes clear a fact. which
was formerly in doubt that new trials are granted
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to allow the defeated party to add cumulative evidence newly discovered, and that only where there
is a clear probability that the result of a new trial
would be different.'
"As to the conflict in the affidavits on the question of whether or not plaintiff made certain statements to the insurance agent, defendants contend
that this should be resolved by a jury in a new
trial. The ready answer to that contention is that
it is well settled in this jurisdiction that where the
newly discovered evidence is merely impeachment
of an adverse witness, it is not sufficient to justify
a new trial. Klopenstine v. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57
P. 712; Trimble v. Union Pac. Stages, 105 Utah 457,
142 P. 2d 674."

CONCLUSION
Judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
McCullough, Boyce and McCullough
Attorneys for Respondents
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